This paper proposes Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism (EPC), a descriptive model of moral epistemology designed to re-frame, rather than solve, the is/ought problem. Building on Quine’s holism, EPC models knowledge as an emergent hierarchy of shared “networks of predicates” scaling up from the individual “web of belief.” Within this architecture, truth is treated deflationarily: not as correspondence with ultimate reality, but as a functional label for robust coherence within a pragmatically-tested network. Crucially, EPC disciplines this network-relativity through an external, selective filter: evolutionary pragmatic selection, the relentless pressure exerted by reality itself. Networks incurring high systemic costs collapse over time, while resilient networks propagate. This process grounds a form of procedural objectivity: truth is internal to networks, but networks themselves can be objectively ranked by their long-term viability. The ultimate regulative standard is a real, emergent historical object—the Apex Network—understood not as a metaphysical ideal but as the cumulative record of predicates that have survived humanity’s long encounter with reality. EPC’s central claim is conditional: if we begin from minimal naturalism, where endurance is a non-negotiable constraint, then EPC provides the best available account of moral progress—not from metaphysical fiat, but from the empirical lessons encoded in our most resilient social and epistemic structures.
This initial network-relativity is disciplined by a procedural and objective process of evolutionary pragmatic selection. The model posits that networks are continuously filtered by the constraints of reality, and that unviable networks—those generating high degrees of systemic friction, or pragmatic pushback—are abandoned over time. Consequently, while 'truth' is a property internal to a network, the networks themselves can be objectively ranked by their long-term pragmatic viability. The ultimate standard for this ranking is a theoretical, emergent object this paper terms the Apex Network.
EPC's central claim is conditional: if we begin from a minimal naturalism where endurance is a de facto constraint, then EPC provides a robust model of procedural objectivity. The paper does not seek to solve the ultimate grounding problem but to describe the system that in fact adjudicates our normative claims. It offers a naturalistic model of moral progress, locating the source of normative authority not in a metaphysical foundation, but in the cumulative, hard-won lessons encoded in humanity's most resilient social and epistemic structures. EPC’s contribution is to naturalize moral epistemology by unifying descriptive and normative claims under one selection process, extending Quine’s holism into the moral domain.
For centuries, philosophy has wrestled with the apparent gap between claims of fact (“is”) and claims of value (“ought”). EPC suggests that this gap is not a permanent chasm but an artifact of foundationalist epistemology, which artificially segregates descriptive and normative claims. Rather than building a speculative “bridge” across the gap, this paper describes the system we already use to adjudicate both: the evolutionary court of pragmatic selection. On this view, facts and values are tested by the same filter—the unforgiving feedback of reality—and the authority of an “ought” emerges not from metaphysical foundations but from survival-tested coherence.
This paper presents such a model: Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism (EPC). At its core, EPC is a systematic extrapolation of Quinean holism. It begins with the premise that individuals navigate reality using a “web of belief,” a coherent but fallible network of claims. Because all agents face the constraints of a shared reality, these individual webs inevitably overlap where they prove pragmatically successful, giving rise to an emergent hierarchy of shared networks. EPC models this entire system as an evolutionary process. A claim is 'true' in a deflationary sense: it is coherent within a given network. However, the networks themselves are subject to a ruthless, external filter this paper terms evolutionary pragmatic selection. Networks that generate high degrees of systemic friction, or pragmatic pushback, are less viable and tend to be abandoned over time. The ultimate standard for this process is a theoretical, emergent object—the maximal set of historically viable predicates—termed the Apex Network. Our access to this standard is primarily negative, through the construction of an evidence-based Negative Canon of failed systems.
The argument will proceed by first detailing the core architecture of the EPC model: the bottom-up emergence of shared networks, the evolutionary engine of pragmatic selection, and the negative, historical methodology by which we approximate a standard of objectivity. The paper will then demonstrate the framework's explanatory power by applying its diagnostic tools throughout to a primary historical case study: the abolition of slavery. With the model fully articulated and illustrated, the argument will turn to defending it against the most pressing philosophical objections and, finally, situating it in the contemporary landscape by distinguishing it from its major rivals.
It is essential to be precise about scope. EPC does not claim to solve the ultimate problem of grounding normativity, nor to provide a non-circular answer to “why value survival?” Instead, it takes a conditional, descriptive turn. Its claim is modest but powerful: if we assume minimal naturalism—where endurance is the de facto constraint on any system—then EPC provides a robust account of procedural objectivity and moral progress. This conditionality is not a weakness but a methodological strength: by bracketing metaphysical ultimates, EPC avoids endless regress and instead models the actual process by which our normative claims are tested and revised. It does not provide a non-circular answer to the question, "Why should I value pragmatic viability?"
Instead, EPC is a conditional and descriptive model of moral epistemology. Its central claim is this: if one begins from a minimal naturalism where endurance is a de facto constraint on any system, then EPC provides a robust model of procedural objectivity and moral progress. The paper does not defend the initial 'if'—a task for a different metaethical project—but rather demonstrates the explanatory power of the 'then'.
Its ambition is not to prove that we ought to play this game, but to provide the first systematic description of the rules of the game we are already playing. It shifts the focus from a futile search for metaphysical foundations to the construction of a testable model of the evolutionary process by which values are filtered, retained, and come to have authority. It describes the court of pragmatic selection; it does not attempt to justify that court's ultimate jurisdiction.
Within this descriptive framework, EPC employs a deflationary account of truth. 'Truth' is not a claim of correspondence with ultimate reality, but a functional label for a predicate’s robust coherence within a specified, pragmatically-tested network. A critic might then ask: why should this internal property of 'truth' have any normative force?
The answer lies in the evolutionary origin of the network itself. A shared network is not a logic puzzle; it is a tool for survival forged in the crucible of history. The descriptive fact that a predicate is 'true' (i.e., coherent with one of our most successful, time-tested networks) is therefore a powerful empirical signal. It indicates that the predicate is an integral component of a highly viable strategy for navigating reality.
This reconnects the 'is' and the 'ought' in a procedural way. The 'is' of a predicate's truth-value serves as a reliable guide to the pragmatic 'ought', precisely because that network's coherence was itself forged by the unforgiving 'is' of reality's feedback. This approach bypasses the traditional is/ought problem not by grounding 'ought' in a metaphysical fact, but by treating it as an evidence-based recommendation derived from the descriptive facts of survival. In this, it shares a goal with naturalistic projects like those of Midgley or Curry, which seek to dissolve the fallacy by showing that normative claims are already embedded in the empirical project of navigating a constrained reality. To trust what is 'true' in our best networks is therefore not an appeal to correspondence with a hidden reality, but a pragmatic wager: the hard-won lessons of history are more reliable guides than our untested intuitions. This reframes the is/ought problem procedurally: the “is” of a predicate’s truth-value signals the pragmatic “ought,” because coherence itself has already been stress-tested against reality’s feedback. EPC therefore grounds normativity not in metaphysics but in the cumulative survival data of humanity’s most resilient networks.
The foundation of Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism is a systematic extrapolation of W.V.O. Quine’s holism. Just as Quine’s critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction collapsed the wall between truths of logic and truths of fact, EPC uses his holistic framework to re-frame the distinction between facts and values. Quine famously pictured an individual's knowledge as a “web of belief”—a contextual, coherent network that serves as the arena in which truth-claims are made and adjudicated.¹ While a brilliant metaphor, it remains fundamentally psychological. The task for a social epistemology is to model the structural nature of our shared knowledge.