The is/ought problem, this paper argues, is not a metaphysical chasm to be bridged but an artifact of foundationalist epistemology. To reframe it, this paper develops Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism (EPC), a descriptive model of moral knowledge. Building on Quine’s holism, EPC models all knowledge as an emergent hierarchy of shared “networks of predicates.” This social-epistemic architecture scales from the individual’s “web of belief” to encompass entire traditions of inquiry. Within this architecture, truth is treated deflationary as a functional label for robust coherence within a pragmatically-tested network. This network-relative conception of truth is simultaneously disciplined by an external selective filter—evolutionary pragmatic selection—where the ultimate metric is not mere persistence but pragmatic viability: a system's homeostatic efficiency in propagating its structure with minimal coercive cost. Networks incurring high systemic costs collapse over time, while efficient, resilient networks propagate. This process grounds a form of procedural objectivity: while truth is a property internal to a network, networks themselves can be objectively ranked by their long-term viability. The ultimate regulative standard is the Apex Network—a theoretical model of a real, emergent historical object representing the cumulative record of predicates that have proven most viable. EPC’s central claim is conditional: if we begin from minimal naturalism, where endurance is a non-negotiable constraint, then EPC provides a robust account of moral progress. It locates normative authority not in metaphysical fiat or non-cognitive attitudes, but in the empirical lessons encoded in humanity’s most resilient social and epistemic structures.
For centuries, philosophy has treated the gap between claims of fact (“is”) and claims of value (“ought”) as a fundamental chasm in our conceptual landscape. This paper argues that the infamous is/ought problem is not a foundational feature of reality but a famous symptom of foundationalist epistemology, which artificially segregates descriptive and normative claims. The solution proposed here is not to build another speculative bridge across the gap, but to adopt an epistemology where no such gap arises in the first place—a unified system that adjudicates all claims in the same evolutionary court of pragmatic selection.
While EPC proposes a unified model of justification applicable to all domains of inquiry, this paper will test its viability against its most challenging application: the fact/value distinction. In this, it applies the methodological spirit of W.V.O. Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction. By treating claims like “water boils at 100°C” and “murder is wrong” as formally commensurable ‘predicates’ within a single holistic framework, we can see that they are tested by the same unforgiving filter: the feedback of reality. The authority of an “ought” emerges not from a mysterious normative realm, but from the hard-won, survival-tested coherence of our best maps of the world.
To realize this Quinean ambition, this paper defends a framework formally titled Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism (EPC). At its core, EPC is a systematic extrapolation of Quinean holism. It begins with the premise that individuals navigate reality using a fallible “web of belief” (Quine 1951). Because all agents face shared constraints, their individual webs are forced to overlap where pragmatically successful, giving rise to an emergent hierarchy of shared networks. A claim is 'true' in a deflationary sense if it is coherent within a given network. This initial relativity, however, is not the final word. It is disciplined by an external filter of evolutionary pragmatic selection, which grounds a form of procedural objectivity. Networks generating high degrees of systemic friction prove less viable and are abandoned over time, allowing for an objective ranking of networks based on their long-term pragmatic success. The ultimate regulative standard for this process is the Apex Network—a theoretical model of the real, emergent object that is the sum of humanity's historically successful predicates.
It is essential to be precise about the scope of this project. EPC does not claim to solve the ultimate problem of grounding normativity, nor does it provide a non-circular answer to the question, “Why value survival?” Instead, it takes a descriptive and conditional turn. Its central claim is this: if one begins from a minimal naturalism where endurance is a de facto constraint on any system, then EPC provides a robust model of procedural objectivity and moral progress.
This paper does not defend the initial ‘if’—a task for a different metaethical project—but rather demonstrates the explanatory power of the ‘then’. Its ambition is not to prove that we ought to play this game, but to provide the first systematic description of the rules of the game we are already playing. It shifts the focus from a futile search for metaphysical foundations to the construction of a testable model of the evolutionary process by which values are filtered, retained, and come to have authority. It describes the court of pragmatic selection; it does not attempt to justify that court’s ultimate jurisdiction.
Within this descriptive framework, why should a 'true' predicate—one that is merely coherent with a successful network—have any normative force? The answer lies in the network's evolutionary origin. A shared network is not a logic puzzle; it is a tool for navigating reality forged in the crucible of history. The descriptive fact that a predicate is 'true' within one of our most time-tested networks is therefore a powerful empirical signal: it indicates that the predicate is an integral component of a highly viable strategy.
This reconnects the 'is' and the 'ought' procedurally. The “is” of a predicate’s truth-value serves as a reliable guide to the pragmatic “ought,” precisely because that network’s coherence was itself forged by the unforgiving “is” of reality’s feedback. To trust what is 'true' in our best networks is therefore not an appeal to metaphysical correspondence, but a pragmatic wager: the hard-won lessons of history are more reliable guides than our untested intuitions.
The argument constructs the EPC architecture in three stages: it first details the emergence of shared networks from individual webs (Section 2), then defines the evolutionary engine of pragmatic viability that selects among them (Section 3), and finally outlines the negative, empirical methodology for approximating the resulting objectivity (Section 4). With the model fully articulated, it will be defended against critical objections (Section 5) and situated within the contemporary philosophical landscape (Section 6).
Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism begins not with a novel invention but with a systematic extrapolation of Quinean holism, extending it from an individual, psychological model to a social epistemology. The architecture rests on two basic premises:
From these premises, a third fact follows with structural necessity: wherever agents successfully interact with reality, their individual webs are forced to overlap. This intersection is not a conscious negotiation or a top-down agreement, but an automatic, bottom-up emergence. When two people build a canoe, each recalibrates their own web in light of material constraints (buoyancy, wood strength) and the demands of cooperation. Their individual adjustments converge, producing a shared, functional network of beliefs. Crucially, this network cannot drift arbitrarily; only those recalibrations that succeed under the external constraints of reality persist. This eliminative pressure grounds the network’s objectivity, a process that scales dynamically across all levels of social organization, from scientific communities to legal systems.
This scaling from simple cooperation to complex social systems requires a more formal analytic tool. To that end, EPC makes a crucial shift from the psychological language of a "web of belief" to the more formal concept of a “network of predicates.” A predicate is the logical structure of a claim that says something about a subject—for instance, the propositional content of “…is wrong,” “…boils at 100°C,” or “…is a viable social strategy.” This is more than a semantic tweak; this move is vital for three reasons.